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This paper has a simple and straightforward purpose: to calculate the 
present value of Social Security payroll taxes and benefits received for a 
series of cohorts who have reached retirement age since the system began 
in 1937. Such a calculation is of  interest for at least two reasons. First, 
despite the great ink spillage on Social Security in the 1970s, one will 
search in vain for a simple historical calculation of  the type presented 
here. While a number of calculations have been made of the internal rates 
of  return to Social Security taxes and of  related present values (e.g., 
Aaron 1977; Brittain 1972; Burkhauser and Warlick 1979; Feldstein and 
Pellechio 1977; Freiden, Leimer, and Hoffman 1976; Pechman, Aaron, 
and Taussig 1968;  and others), none have systematically  examined trends 
in Social Security wealth for the entire period since 1937, nor have any 
presented  a systematic analysis of  the causes of  the trends in Social 
Security wealth. This is not to say, however, that there is not already 
widely perceived conventional wisdom on what the postwar trends have 
been. This conventional wisdom (as several fellow economists at the 
University of Maryland and the Brookings Institution have confirmed) is 
that (a) cohorts retiring  to date have received more in present-value 
terms than they have paid in; (b) that the magnitude of  the net present 
value  of  benefits  minus taxes,  representing  the  across-cohort  or in- 
tergenerational transfer provided by  the system, was greatest for the 
earliest cohorts and has steadily fallen over time (at least in some relative 
sense); and (c) that (a) and (b) are simple reflections of a pay-as-you-go 
system, for in such a system the benefits of  each group of  retirees are 
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financed by the taxes of  the contemporaneous  group of  workers, implying 
that the first few retiring cohorts will have paid in very little and therefore 
will do very well relative to their contributions. The calculations in this 
paper confirm these prior concepts in their broad outlines, but the exact 
senses in which they are true are clarified considerably. In addition, in at 
least one particular (whether  the transfer has increased or decreased over 
time) the calculations show that in a sense the conventional wisdom is 
quite misleading, if  not incorrect. 
A second motivation for this exercise-which  provided the stimulus for 
my original interest in these calculations-relates  to the behavioral ques- 
tion of whether the Social Security system has historically had any effects 
on savings and hence the capital stock (Feldstein 1974) or on labor supply 
or retirement (Burkhauser and Turner 1978). Most of  the time-series 
studies of these questions (see Danziger,  Haveman, and Plotnick 1981  for 
a review) have relied on a calculation of  the total value of Social Security 
wealth, which  is very  unlike that calculated here. The wealth  series 
calculated by Feldstein (1974) and Munnell (1974), and updated more 
recently by Leimer and Lesnoy (1980)-I  shall call it the FMLL series- 
calculates for each group of  individuals of a certain age the present value 
of  future benefits minus only the present value of future taxes to be paid; 
past taxes are not included. The exclusion of past taxes is suggested by 
analogy with  the Ando-Modigliani-Brumberg  model of  life-cycle con- 
sumption, in  which  consumption  is  assumed to be a function of  the 
present value of two variables: that of the future income stream,  plus that 
of  assets as of  the current time, rather than as of the beginning of  the life 
cycle. In a fully funded Social Security system, one in which past taxes are 
accumulated  in  a reserve fund for future retirees,  the economy-wide 
value of contemporaneous assets would include the value of  this reserve 
fund and hence the present value of past taxes. But in a pay-as-you-go 
system, one in which taxes are quickly paid out as benefits, no reserve 
fund is present and hence the model in no way represents past taxes. This 
would  seem to call  for some modification  of  the Ando-Modigliani- 
Brumberg model for an examination of Social Security, for it is rather 
difficult to see how the life-cycle effects of Social Security can be esti- 
mated when the value of past taxes paid in is assumed to  have no effect on 
behavior. This paper in no way directly addresses this modeling issue, but 
clearly an alternative approach to  examining the time-series evidence on 
Social Security would  be to start with  a more  strictly cohort-defined 
Social Security wealth variable of the type developed here.' 
9.1  Preliminaries 
The Social Security Act of  1935 established the basis for the Old Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance program in the United States. How- 329  Trends in Social Security Wealth by Cohort 
ever, the 1935 Act merely provided the basis for the present program; it 
has changed enormously since then. For example, the 1935 Act provided 
only for retirement benefits-benefits  for survivors of  covered workers 
and for dependents were enacted at later dates. Also, under the initial 
Act benefits were much lower than now, payroll tax rates were consider- 
ably less, and coverage of  the working population was below what it is 
today. In a series of  amendments to the Act since 1935, benefits have 
been increased and liberalized, tax rates have been raised, and coverage 
has been broadened. 
Nevertheless, the structure of  the program for present purposes has 
always been roughly the same. Covered workers are required to pay a 
legislated percent of their earnings up to a legislated amount, termed the 
taxable maximum earnings level. Employers are required to pay an equal 
percentage of their employees’ earnings up to the same maximum. At the 
age of 65, or somewhat earlier since early retirement has been permitted, 
individuals who have accumulated sufficient quarters of  coverage are 
entitled to benefits of various types. Four types of benefits represent the 
bulk of  the system’s expenditures. One represents payments to retired 
men who are entitled to benefits under their earnings records; another is 
the equivalent payment to  women entitled under their earnings records; a 
third is the payment to wives who choose to take the amount to which 
they are entitled under their husbands’ earnings records; and the fourth is 
the payment to aged widows who are entitled to survivor benefits under 
their late spouses’ earnings records. In all cases the single most important 
characteristic of the system is that benefits are not directly based on taxes 
paid in. Rather, they are based on a weighted average of  lifetime earn- 
ings, the weights being determined by a fairly complicated formula which 
has changed over time. Hence the relationship between contributions 
and benefits is indirect and often very loose. 
The conceptual basis for the calculations of  the net present value of 
benefits minus taxes is simple. Taxes began to be paid in 1937; benefits 
began to be paid in 1940. For each birth cohort that has reached retire- 
ment age since 1940, the calculation desired requires a stream of  tax 
payments and benefit payments at each age in that cohort’s lifetime. 
Summed and discounted, the requisite net present value is obtained. 
However, the available published data are not in perfect form for this 
calculation. Benefits of various types are generally available by age and 
sex in each year, as are the number of benefit recipients of each type. In 
the upper age ranges the data are often grouped into broad age intervals, 
requiring some interpolation to obtain amounts for smaller age intervals. 
Unfortunately, tax payments by  age and sex are not available. Conse- 
quently, data on annual earnings by age and sex are used in conjunction 
with the relevant payroll tax rate to estimate tax payments? Since pay- 
ments are made only up to a certain maximum, and since only median 330  Robert Moffitt 
earnings are available, some assumption regarding the distribution of 
earnings must be made to determine how many individuals are and are 
not at the maximum. 
For the purposes of  this paper, life-cycle streams of taxes and benefits 
are calculated for eight cohorts spaced at five-year intervals. The tax and 
benefit payments are in turn grouped into five-year age intervals begin- 
ning at age 15 and running up to age 74.  The final 75+  category is 
open-ended. All data sources and algorithms are reported in appendix A. 
This is perhaps the appropriate point to note several caveats to the 
analysis. First, since aggregate data are used in the calculations, infer- 
ences regarding individuals within cohorts are difficult and, at times, 
hazardous. Whether the present value of benefits equals that of taxes for 
any individual or group of  individuals within a cohort cannot be ascer- 
tained.  A  fortiori,  only intergenerational transfers  created by  Social 
Security  are presented  here;  intragenerational transfers  are  not  ex- 
amined. Second, it should be pointed out that welfare inferences based 
on these calculations are also hazardous.  Since individuals can adjust 
their saving behavior, their dates of  retirement, their earnings amounts 
over their lifetime, and their family types (they can sometimes alter the 
type of benefit they receive), the ultimate value of the net transfer is to a 
certain  extent endogenous. This problem  is common to virtually all 
studies of the distributional impact of transfers. Third, no wealth values 
are calculated for cohorts who have not yet reached retirement age. Since 
their future taxes and benefits are subject to legislative changes, their 
wealth values are inherently a matter of  speculation? 
9.2  Results 
9.2.1  Benefit and Tax Trends 
Table 9.1 shows the mean real monthly benefit paid to each of the eight 
cohorts when they reach the 65-69 age category. Each cohort is denoted 
by the year in which the cohort reached the median age in this category 
(67). All dollar amounts in this paper are in real 1967 dollars. As the table 
indicates, benefits have always been greatest for retired male workers, as 
should be expected on the basis of their high earnings profiles. However, 
neither benefits for men nor for the three categories of women have risen 
smoothly over time.  Nominal  benefits were  unchanged  between  the 
Social Security Amendments of  1939 and 1950, causing real benefits to 
fall over this period. Hence the 1947 cohort began at a lower level than 
the  1942 cohort. However,  the  1950 Amendments greatly increased 
benefit levels, the percentage increase ranging from 47 to 63 percent 
depending on the benefit type. These benefit increases applied across the 
board and increased the benefits of  all retirees at all ages, not just new Table 9.1  Benefit Amounts and Replacement Rates by Cohorta 
Monthly Benefit at Age 65-69  Benefit Replacement  Rate at Age 65-69b 
Retired  Retired  Retired  Retired 
Cohort'  Males  Females  Wives  Widows  Males  Females  Wives  Widows 
1942  47  41  27  41  .23  .36  .13  .20 
1947  44  32  22  32  .20  .36  .10  .15 
1952  67  47  35  52  .23  .34  .12  .18 
1957  91  67  44  63  .29  .45  .14  .20 
1962  101  72  46  77  .29  .45  .13  .22 
1967  96  74  43  82  .25  .38  .ll  .21 
1972  149  117  69  116  .25  .49  .15  .25 
1977  155  119  71  126  .32  .46  .14  .25 
"All dollar amounts are in real 1967 dollars. 
bBenefit as percent of earnings at age 62. Male earnings used for all but retired females. 
"Year in which cohort is age 67. 332  Robert Moffitt 
retirees. Real benefit growth was substantially lower in the subsequent 
years, and even fell again in real terms in the early 1960~~  another period 
of a faster price growth than nominal benefit growth. A second explosion 
of  benefits occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, generating real 
benefit increases comparable in percentage terms to those of  the early 
1950s. 
The table also shows the replacement rates of  those in the 65-69 age 
category for each cohort, representing the ratio of benefits to  the earnings 
of the same cohort five years earlier. Although replacement rates have 
wavered quite a bit, they have very slowly increased for some benefit 
types. On the whole, however, there have been no major changes in their 
values. 
Figure 9.1 shows the benefit profiles of male retirees of each cohort as it 
aged from the 65-69 category. Benefits change over time for a cohort for 
several reasons: new members of the cohort retire, perhaps at different 
(presumably larger) benefit levels; other members of  the cohort die, 
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survivor status, probably with an increase in the benefit level; and legisla- 
tion or lack of it allows the real value of benefits for the same individual to 
change. The figure indicates the last of  these effects completely domi- 
nates the life-cycle growth of benefits during retirement. Sharp increases 
in benefits occurred in the early 1950s and late 1960s, regardless of the age 
of the recipient. In addition, the shape of  the profile varies greatly from 
cohort to cohort; it is sometimes convex, sometimes concave, sometimes 
relatively flat (as during the late 1950s and early 1960s). This extreme 
unevenness would seem to  pose some problems for the standard life-cycle 
model with complete certainty, for it is difficult to see how these benefit 
profiles could have been correctly anticipated. 
Table 9.2 shows the number of recipients per capita of each type at the 
base age range 65-69.  Although more than 80 percent of men and women 
in the 1977 cohort received benefits, only 8 percent of men and 5 percent 
of  women in the 1942 cohort did. These extremely low recipiency rates 
should cast some doubt on the extent to which early cohorts did well 
under the system, for while those actually receiving benefits may have 
done famously, very few actually received them (presumably because 
they had not accumulated sufficient quarters of  covered earnings). Un- 
like the standard model of a pay-as-you-go  system in which all the elderly 
are immediately blanketed into the system at its start, in the U.S. system 
eligibility was highly restricted in the beginning. 
Figure 9.2 shows the recipiency rate profiles for male retirees in each 
cohort.  Unlike  the benefit profiles, here  the shapes are consistently 
concave over time. Recipiency rates  rose more  rapidly for the early 
cohorts as they aged, probably because a disproportionately large num- 
ber became eligible (Le., attained insured status) at later ages. In addi- 
tion, as recipiency rates approach 100 percent, there must by necessity be 
a leveling-off of  the profiles. 
Table 9.3 shows some of  the relevant trends affecting tax payments 
Table 9.2  Recipients Per Capita at Age 65-69 
Females 
Retired  Retired 
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70-74,  75+ 
over the period since 1937. Notably, tax rates stayed quite low until the 
early 1960s, when they began to rise steadily. As a consequence, the 
cohorts considered here paid very little tax into the system. Even the 
latest cohort considered in this paper, that aged 67 in 1977,  was already 50 
years old in 1960 when the tax rates began to rise. Hence, the peak of  the 
earnings profile had passed or was near to passing. The table also shows 
that the real value of  the taxable maximum has gone through uneven 
Table 9.3  Trends in Tax Payments and Coverage 
~ 
Annual  Fraction of  Covered 
Taxable  Covered  Male 
Earnings  Workers at  Workers Age 
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changes over the period, also presumably difficult to forecast. The real 
maximum declined from 1937 to 1947 and rose thereafter. But apparently 
it did not rise as fast as earnings, for the percent of  covered workers 
paying the maximum tax rose steadily until 1962, after which it declined 
as the real maximum accelerated. The increases in the percentage of 
workers hitting the taxable maximum reinforces the effect of  low mar- 
ginal taxes and lowers further the percentage of earnings actually paid in 
the form of  taxes for these cohorts. 
9.2.2  Social Security Wealth 
The value of  Social Security wealth, S, is calculated as the difference 
between  the present value of  benefits, SB, and taxes,  ST. The term 
“Social Security wealth” as used in this paper will  always refer to net 
wealth (net of taxes, that is). It will be zero in an actuarially fair system. 
The benefit value is calculated as: 
1  4  75+  Rf B,k 
SB=-X  C 
N17  k=l a=62  (1 + r)’-17’ 
where R,k denotes the number of recipients of benefit type k at age a,  B,k is 
the mean real benefit of  type k at age a, NI7  is the population size at age 
17, and r is the real rate of  interest. In most of  the calculations, r is 
assumed to equal .03, as assumed by FMLL, although S is also calculated 
for other interest rates. The trends in  wealth across cohorts are not 
significantly affected by  this choice, although obviously the absolute 
amount of  calculated wealth will be. It should be noted too that a few 
projections of benefits are required for the calculation of  SB, namely (1) 
the benefits of those aged 75 + for the 1972 cohort and (2) the benefits of 
those aged 70-74  and 75 + for the 1977 cohort. For these projections, 
benefits are assumed to grow over these age ranges at the same rate as 
they did for the previous cohort. As an approximation this should be 
sufficiently close to probable actual experience. 
It should also be noted that SB is divided by the number of individuals 
alive at age 17, putting the wealth measure on a per capita basis. Thus SB 
represents the aggregate value of all benefits received by all members of a 
cohort, but on a per capita basis. This definition will become important 
below, for it is not the same as the wealth value of  recipients only-it 
includes all those who die before reaching retirement age and those who 
reach retirement age but do not receive benefits. As a result, the measure 
SB  can  grow  as a  result  of  increased  life expectancy and  increased 
coverage and recipiency rates, as well as from increased benefit levels for 
those who receive benefits. Although the growth of benefits for recipients 
alone is of some interest by itself, the measure here is the more compre- 
hensive one necessary to compare each cohort as a whole to each other 
cohort as a whole. 
The present value of  tax payments is the following: 336  Robert Moffitt 
Ca  Ta  1  75+ 
ST=-  C 
N17  a=17 (1 + r)a-17’ 
where Ca  is the number of covered workers at age a,  and Ta is the mean 
tax payment at age a per covered worker. Both are equal to zero if  the 
cohort is at an age prior to 1937. The tax payment is calculated as: 
(3)  T,  =  Pa [ua Y,  + (1 -  ua) YMaI 
+  Pa [ua Y,  + (1 -  ua) YMaI (1 -  sa)  9 
where u, is the estimated fraction of  the cohort at age a whose earnings 
are below the taxable maximum, pa  is the payroll tax rate at age a, Ya  is 
the value of earnings conditional on being below the maximum, YM,  is 
the value  of  the taxable  maximum  earnings  at age  a, and s,  is  the 
non-Social  Security personal tax rate on earnings. The tax payment is 
composed of  an employee component and an employer component, with 
the latter deflated by (1 -  s,)  because it is not subject to tax. Note that 
the usual assumption of complete shifting of the employer portion onto 
the employee is  followed  here. Finally,  the value of  Social Security 
wealth is S = SB - ST. 
Before presenting the results of  the wealth calculation, the basic princi- 
ples of a developing pay-as-you-go system should be briefly mentioned 
(Samuelson 1958; Diamond 1965; Aaron 1966). In a simple economy in 
which real wages grow at the rate g and the labor force grows at the rate n, 
a pay-as-you-go system in which all tax receipts are immediately paid out 
as benefits can attain a long-run equilibrium under which each individual 
obtains a  rate of  return (n + g) on his payroll  contributions.  Both 
productivity growth and labor-force growth allow each cohort to “bor- 
row”  against  future generations at this  rate in  Ponzi fashion.  If  the 
interest rate r is equal to (n  + g), the cohort could have done equally well 
with private  savings and hence the program  is actuarially fair. If  r is 
greater (less) than (n + g), the program is less (more) than actuarially 
fair and each cohort receives a negative  (positive) lifetime net wealth 
increment. However, in the beginning such a system must give the first 
generation of  retirees a net rate of  return greater than (n + g -  r),  for 
these cohorts did not pay  a full lifetime of  taxes but receive the full 
amount of  receipts from current workers. Therefore in the immature 
phase of the system the value of the intergenerational transfer should fall, 
at least relative to wage growth, and should approach some equilibrium 
level. 
Main Results 
The results of  the net wealth calculation for the eight cohorts are shown 
in table 9.4. As the table indicates, each member of the cohort born in 
1892 who was alive at age 17  (i.e., in 1909) received a net present value of 337  Trends in Social Security Wealth by  Cohort 
Table 9.4  Trends in Social Security Wealth By Cohort (1967 dollars) 
Five-Year 
Absolute  Growth Rate 
Cohort  S  Change  (%) 
1942  $  24  $  39  163 
1947  63  82  130 
1952  145  95  66 
1957  240  116  48 
1962  356  88  25 
1967  444  100  23 
1972  544  53  10 
1977  597  -  - 
$24. The absolute size of  this number is small because (1) it is discounted 
back to age 17 since that is the beginning of  the life cycle (multiply by 
about four to get age-65 values); (2) it is in 1967  dollars; and (3) it includes 
many nonrecipients, almost 70-90  percent of  the members of  the first 
cohort (see figure 9.2). More important is the relative size of  the wealth 
values across cohorts. For the 1977 cohort, S was $597, about 25 times 
greater-implying  an average annual growth rate (in real terms) of  about 
14 percent. The results immediately answer some of the basic questions 
regarding trends in Social Security wealth. First, it has risen in absolute 
value for all cohorts reaching retirement  age up to 1977. This is not 
incompatible with  an immature, or developing,  pay-as-you-go  Social 
Security system, but it is also not necessary; in the usual model of  such a 
system the absolute value of wealth falls over time. To the extent that the 
caveat about welfare implications mentioned above is ignored, it appears 
that the absolute size of  the intergenerational transfer received by more 
recent  cohorts  is larger that that received  by  early cohorts.  Second, 
however, the growth rate of  the wealth value has indeed slowed over 
time, consistent with expectations. The absolute value of the difference 
from one cohort to the next rose until the 1960s and appears to have 
begun falling by 1977. The growth rate of wealth, exceedingly large at 
first, has fallen with every succeeding cohort. 
Components of Growth 
Equally important is the determination of what has caused this particu- 
lar growth pattern. Table 9.5 breaks down the net wealth values into their 
benefit and tax components (SB and ST) and subcomponents. The table 
shows that growth in benefits has dominated the growth in net wealth, for 
changes in net wealth were almost entirely  determined  as a result of 
significant benefit growth combined with tiny tax growth (SB grew from 
$27 to $815 while ST only from $4 to $218). ST remained small and grew 
very little in absolute terms until the 1970s. The subcomponents of  SB 338  Robert Moffitt 
Table 9.5  Components of Growth in Social Security Wealth (S = SB -  ST) 
SB"  ST" 
Retired  Retired 
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"Components may not add up exactly because of  rounding error. 
b0.3. 
show that over most of  the period the benefits of male retirees contrib- 
uted the most in absolute terms to its growth. However, since the 1960s, 
benefits claimed by  women on the basis of  their own earnings records 
(retired females) have grown in approximately the same amounts as those 
of  men. Correspondingly, the growth of  benefits claimed by dependent 
wives has virtually halted. This is an interesting result, presumably caused 
by the increase in the number of  working wives with significant lifetime 
wage profiles. As wives' earnings increase, the benefits for which they are 
eligible alone also increase. Since the law automatically grants wives the 
larger of  either the benefit for which they are eligible alone or that for 
which they are eligible under their husbands' records (usually about 50 
percent of  his benefit), wives' earnings growth should result in a gradual 
switching from the wives category to the retired females category. 
Table 9.6 shows the results of  further decomposing the change in  S 
from cohort to cohort into several parts. The formula for SB can be 
rewritten as: 
(4) 
Nf 75+  NL  R,k  B,"  +17  2  2-- 
N17  a=62 k=2 Nf7  NL (1 +  ' 
where N," is the size of the male population at age a, and NLis the size of 
the corresponding female population,  and where k  = 1 denotes male 
retired-worker  benefits, and k  = 2, 3, and 4 denote the three female 
benefit  types.  The change in SB from cohort to cohort may thus be 
decomposed into changes in (a) the fraction of  the cohort that is male at 
age  17; (b) the sex-specific life  probabilities  (fraction  of  population Table 9.6  Decomposition of Growth of Social Security Wealtha (percentages X  100) 
Benefits per Recipient  Recipients per Capita  Taxes per Capita 
Taxes  Level 
Replace-  Per  Cover-  of  Life  Age 
ment  Benefit  Earn-  Covered  age  Employ-  Prob-  in 
Cohorts  Total  Rateb  Growth  ings=  Total  Basicb  Growth  Total  Worker  Rated  ment  abilities  1937 
1942-1947  16  -9  28  1  65  55  11  -4  0  -4  1  6  -7 
1947-1 952  19  12  -  19  33  58  148  -  30  -4  0  -3  0  7  -6 
1952-1957  29  41  -  21  13  61  143  -  43  -7  -3  -1  -2  7  -7 
1957-1962  57  0  28  26  34  69  -  27  -  11  -7  -2  -2  6  -8 
1962-1 967  65  -  63  72  67  36  38  -1  -  27  -  16  -7  -2  19  -  14 
1967-1972  101  155  -120  102  18  53  -  33  -  40  -  27  -6  -3  26  -  15 
1972-1 977  87  -  62  35  117  86  85  5  -  99  -  84  -  13  4  44  -  35 
"Numbers for each cohort pair calculated as (S:+  -  Sf)/(&+ -  Sf),  where S, is the actual net wealth value for cohort t (see table 9.4), and Si+  is the value 
of  wealth which cohort t+ 1 would have had if variable i had changed but all other variables had remained at cohort tvalues. Since the decomposition is only 
a first-order Taylor series approximation, horizontal sums do not sum to 100. 
bAt age 65-69. 
'At  age 60-64. 
dNumber of  covered workers divided by level of  employment. 340  Robert Moffitt 
surviving to each age); (c) the benefit recipiency rate per capita; and (d) 
the size of  the benefit. 
The formula for ST can be rewritten as the following: 
ST=-  NZ  7s+  2  2-  N"  C"T"  1 
+17  Nf  75+  2 --  N;f C;fT," 
N17  a=17  NE  N,"  (1 + r)a-17  (5) 
1 
NI7  a=l7  Nf7  N;f  (1 + r)a-17' 
Thus the growth in ST  can be decomposed into changes in the fraction of 
the population that is male at age 17; changes in life probabilities; and 
changes in per capita taxes paid. 
Table 9.6 shows the results of  computing the fractions of the change in 
S from cohort to cohort that result from each of these factors alone. To 
interpret the table, compare the relative magnitudes and signs of  the 
percentages horizontally, across the rows. (The  percentages need not add 
to 100-see  the table.) For example, 65 percent of the change in S from 
the 1942 cohort  to the 1947 cohort  was  a  result  of  a change in  the 
recipiency rate; only 16 percent was a result of  changes in the benefit. 
Increased  taxes  account  for only  a small  -4  percent  of  the change; 
growth in life expectancy for only a +  6 percent; and the fact that the later 
cohort started paying taxes at an earlier age and hence paid more taxes 
accounted for a relatively small  -7  percent.  The table also shows a 
decomposition of  benefit growth into growth in the basic 65-69  benefit 
replacement rate, changes in benefits over the retirement period, and 
changes in earnings; a decomposition of the change in the recipiency rate 
into changes in the basic recipiency rate at age 65-69 and the growth of 
recipiency over the retirement period; and a decomposition of changes in 
per capita taxes into portions resulting from changes in taxes paid per 
covered worker, coverage as a percent of  employment, and the employ- 
ment rate (employment per capita). See appendix A for an exact state- 
ment of  the decomposition. The results show that the growth in benefits 
between the 1942 and 1947 cohorts was mostly a result of  what is called 
benefit growth-that  is, growth of benefits during retirement (i.e., after 
age 69). This can be seen back in figure 9.1  as well. On the other hand, the 
growth in the  recipiency rate appears  to be mostly a result of  growth in the 
basic (i.e., age 67) recipiency  rate, rather than in the growth rate of 
recipiency during retirement. Finally, the wealth-depressing effect of tax 
growth appears to be almost entirely a result of growth in coverage for the 
1942-1947 change rather than from changes in tax rates or employment 
growth. 
Moving down the table, the magnitudes often grow in absolute value. 
This is just a result of the fact that, as taxes grow, benefits must also grow 
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is that the relations between the magnitudes within horizontal rows of  the 
table change over time!  In the early years of  the program most of  the 
growth  was  a  result  of  increases in  the recipiency  rate, rather  than 
changes in  the benefit, as just  mentioned  for the 1942-1947  change. 
However,  the importance of  the latter has gradually increased and that of 
the former has fallen, with the result that benefit growth has been more 
important quantitatively since the 1950s. This should be expected on the 
basis of  the leveling-off of  recipiency growth discussed previously. Also, 
it appears that the determinants of  the change in the benefit itself have 
fluctuated dramatically, sometimes more a result of  a higher age 65-69 
benefit (the replacement rate column) and sometimes more a result of a 
higher growth rate of  benefits at later ages (the benefit growth column). 
Again, figure 9.1 demonstrates why this instability is to be expected. 
Simple growth in earnings has also apparently accounted for an increas- 
ing share of the growth in benefits: with a fixed replacement rate, benefits 
will naturally rise at the same rate as earnings. There is no particular 
rationale for this pattern, for it has resulted from the different ways the 
Social Security formula has been changed over time. The table also shows 
the determinants of the recipiency rate, where it seems that increases in 
the basic rate (i.e., age 67) has been more important than the growth of 
recipiency during retirement in raising net wealth from cohort to cohort. 
The depressing effect of  taxes paid in has been relatively slight over 
most of the period presented here, at least until the 1970s. Also, although 
in the early years what growth did occur in taxes was mainly a result of 
coverage growth (0 vs.  -4  and 0 vs.  -3),  tax growth since then has 
resulted more from the basic change in tax payments per covered worker. 
The growing importance of taxes paid in is also reflected by the growing 
negative percentage accounted for by age at entry in 1937,  for this implies 
more years of tax payments in the lifetime. 
Finally, the results indicate that changes in life expectancy have a net 
positive effect on the growth of S,  although increases in life expectancy 
increase  both benefits  and taxes.  Although  its importance  was slight 
during the early years of  the program, it has grown to such an extent that 
the impact of increased life expectancy amounts in magnitude to almost 
50 percent of  the net change in S  from the 1972 to the 1977 cohorts. 
Life-Cycle Patterns of  Wealth 
Figure 9.3 shows the life-cycle path of  cumulative net Social Security 
wealth for the most recent cohort. The paths of  the other cohorts are 
similar in shape, although each cohort of  an older age began paying taxes 
at a later date. S  is negative  until  the cohort reaches retirement age 
because only taxes have been paid in. For the cohort in the figure, as  well 
as all the other cohorts, (1) S  is always still negative in the 60-64  age 
range, despite the increased frequency of early retirement, and (2) S  is 342  Robert Moffitt 
0 
-  50 
-  100 
-150  -  V 
Fig. 9.3  Life-cycle net Social Security wealth profile for 1977 cohort 
always positive  in  the subsequent, 65-69  age range.  Thus from  the 
perspective of the cohort as a whole-although  not necessarily from that 
of a particular individual-the  system has paid off already by age 69. It is 
also interesting to note that there is an enormous growth of  S in the last 
age category of  75 + . That this holds for all cohorts, not just that in the 
figure, is demonstrated in table 9.7, which shows the value of  S during 
retirement age for each cohort. The growth rate at the final point, often 
more than 100 percent, implies an extremely large payoff at older ages. 
Put differently, if  all members of  the cohort were to die at age 75, net 
wealth would often be only one-half of  what it actually turns out to be. 
Thus the receipt of  benefits by those aged 75 + constitutes a large frac- 
tion, if  not the largest, of  net wealth. 
Alternative Wealth Measures 
Table 9.8 provides additional evidence on the growth of  S. The first 
columns show the values of  S calculated for different values of r. While 
the magnitude  of  S changes in  the expected  direction, the trends in 343  Trends in  Social Security Wealth by Cohort 
Table 9.7  Life-Cycle Growth of Social Security Wealth (S) 
Age 
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Table 9.8  Additional Wealth Measures: Internal Rates of Return, 
Benefit-Cost, and Earned-Wealth  Indicators 
Relationship 
S  Internal  to Earned Wealth 
Cohort  r=  .02  r=  .03  r=  .04  Return  SBiST  V  siv 
Rate of 
1942  42  24 
1947  112  63 
1952  254  145 
1957  420  240 
1962  627  356 
1967  789  444 
1972  975  544 









































absolute  amounts  and  in  growth  rates  obtained  previously are  not 
affected. The table also shows the internal rates of return for each cohort. 
After remaining more or less constant at around 20 percent (in real terms, 
recall) for the early cohorts, the rate of return has fallen steadily to about 
8 percent for the most recent cohort. That these real rates are consider- 
ably higher than .03 or any other possible real rate of  return to private 
savings over this period is just another indication of  the large net in- 
tergenerational transfer  that has been provided to cohorts retiring to 
date. The decline of  these rates of  return is again to be expected in a 
developing system as described above. The table also shows the ratio of 
SB to ST, the benefit-cost ratio frequently employed as a measure of the 
generosity of  the system. This particular  ratio rose for the first three 
cohorts but, like the rate of  return, has fallen since then. 
The final columns in the table show the results of  an attempt to gauge 
the importance of  Social Security wealth relative to private, earned 
wealth. Suppose that the present value of  lifetime earnings is V and that 344  Robert Moffitt 
total wealth is thus W = S + V = V(l + SlV)?  There is also presumably 
some cohort utility function U(W).  In a growing economy we should 
expect V and hence W to grow, but in an immature pay-as-you-go Social 
Security system we should also expect S/V to gradually fall (to zero if the 
equilibrium is at an actuarially fair level). A case could be made on this 
basis that it is the change in S/V-rather  than the change in the internal 
rate of  return, benefit-cost or cost-benefit ratios, or absolute sizes or 
growth  rates of  S-that  should determine the relative well-offness  of 
successive cohorts. 
Estimates  of Vare not possible to obtain directly because earnings  data 
by age, which are needed to construct cohort-specific earnings profiles, 
are not available before  1937. However, these pre-1937 age-earnings 
profiles can be estimated by extrapolating backward from the post-1937 
age-earnings profiles, with due allowance for the general level of  eco- 
nomic activity and hence for the Depression. To do this the post-1937 
age-earnings data were pooled  into a single regression,  and an age- 
earnings profile was estimated  (with dummies for World  War I1 and 
including an index of  the general level of  earnings) and then used to 
generate an age-earnings profile for each cohort from which a value for 
after-tax lifetime earned wealth, V,  was obtained (see appendix B). 
The results of this exercise are shown in table 9.8. As the table indi- 
cates, the ratio S/V appears to have risen all the way up to the 1972 
cohort, contrary to expectations. Thus, it appears that S has risen at a 
sufficiently high rate so that successive cohorts through the early 1970s 
appear to actually have been made better-off by the system than previous 
cohorts! This arises simply because S, though growing at steadily lower 
rates, has nevertheless continued to grow at a faster rate than earnings. 
This result does not appear to be a consequence of an underestimate of 
the growth rate of  V.  To be sure, the results of the regression exercise 
produce a V that actually fell for the first three cohorts in the table. The 
explanation for this trend arises from the fact that the Depression oc- 
curred at a more crucial stage in  the lifetime working  careers of  the 
1947-1957 cohorts than the 1942 or later cohorts. Whereas, for example, 
the 1942 cohort was already 54 years old in 1929-the  working career 
almost over and the earnings profile already dipping-the  three succes- 
sive cohorts were anywhere from 39 to  49 years old in 1929, at the peak of 
their earnings profiles. The depressing effect on lifetime earnings was 
consequently disproportionately  large for the latter groups. Neverthe- 
less, to check the accuracy of the S/V calculation, ratios of S to cohort 
earnings at various 1937 wages were also calculated, ratios requiring no 
estimation procedures at all. The results, shown in appendix B, show 
precisely the same pattern as that of  S/V in table 9.8. 
For the eight cohorts examined here this also means that a conven- 
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increased inequality. For example, the coefficient of variation of  V over 
the eight cohorts is  16, whereas that of  (S +  V) is  18. Across these 
particular  eight  cohorts, that is, the better-off  have  been made still 
better-off. Of  course, this is to a great extent a misleading analogy with 
conventional distributional criteria, for there has been no redistribution 
from earlier cohorts to more recent cohorts except in the negative sense 
that there was a failure to redistribute more, intergenerationally speak- 
ing, toward the early cohorts. The point is, however, that all the net 
wealth increments are intergenerational  transfers from future cohorts to 
current cohorts, and the fact that S/Vhas  been rising implies only that the 
more recent  cohorts have  been  redistributing more, proportionately 
speaking, from future cohorts than previous generations did. Moreover, 
since an increase in S/V cannot continue indefinitely in a pay-as-you-go 
system-indeed,  it has already begun to fall-it  is to be presumed that an 
extension of  this analysis to future cohorts would be capable, at some 
point, of generating a reduction in the coefficient of variation measured 
across all cohorts. 
One puzzle remains: How could S/V rise at all for so long in a pay-as- 
you-go system? The answer, it turns out, is that the system was not in fact 
pay-as-you-go until the mid-1960s. When benefits began to be paid in 
1940, benefit levels were far below what they could have been if  all tax 
receipts (or even most of  them) had been disbursed. In 1940, in fact, the 
trust fund was 40 times the size of benefit payments. The fund gradually 
fell over the following two decades until the mid-l960s, where it has 
stabilized at a level deemed appropriate for contingencies  only  (i.e. , 
sudden shortfalls in revenues). Thus the intergenerational transfer was 
intentionally kept low for the early cohorts. 
9.2.3 
It may be helpful in interpreting these results to put them into context 
by  comparing them with  other Social Security wealth  measures.  The 
wealth measure presented here is simple in  concept:  it measures the 
amount each cohort put in and the amount each got out. Aside from 
having to project a few benefit amounts for the most recent cohorts, all 
the numbers used in these calculations are actual magnitudes of taxes and 
benefits historically paid and received. This is a much simpler and more 
straightforward task than is the calculation of other wealth measures in 
the literature ,  most of which require assumptions regarding the expecta- 
tions of  individuals. For example, estimating the wealth of cohorts not yet 
retired requires not only estimating what benefits and taxes will be in the 
future, but also how cohorts at each age will perceive those benefits and 
taxes. Even in the wealth measure considered by FMLL, which is in- 
tended to be a historical measure, it is assumed that each cohort at each 
age forms a perception of its own wealth only loosely based on actual past 
Remarks on Interpretation and on Future Trends 346  Robert Moffitt 
experience or actual future experience. Thus, for example, much of  the 
discussion of  the FMLL wealth measure has revolved around the appro- 
priateness of  different expectational assumptions. In the wealth measure 
constructed in this paper, on the other hand, no such issues arise because 
no decisions of  this type are necessary in its construction. The study here 
is closely analogous to studies of  the distribution of  transfer benefits, 
inasmuch as both are examinations, to the greatest extent possible, of 
actual benefits received. In addition, although different wealth measures 
are appropriate for different purposes, a measure showing simply how 
well different cohorts have actually done historically seems quite impor- 
tant to  examine. In fact, as mentioned at the beginning of  the paper, it is 
surprising that it has not been examined before. 
The wealth  measure here is  also similar to those used in  transfer- 
benefit  studies  in  the respect  that  both  generally  ignore  behavioral 
effects. For example, to the extent that individuals have retired early to 
obtain higher wealth increments, the present values presented here are 
an exaggeration of true welfare measures. It is for this reason that the 
FMLL measure estimates wealth assuming an age 65 retirement for all, 
but such a restriction is not appropriate when one is simply measuring 
actual benefits received!  As mentioned at the beginning of  the paper, the 
welfare implications of  the measures presented here are consequently 
clouded by this possibility, and by the questions of  the extent to which 
private saving is displaced and the extent to which a stream of unexpected 
changes in wealth yields lower utility than the same stream had it been 
expected. 
Although future trends in Social Security wealth have not been consid- 
ered here, the results may have some implications for such trends. There 
are again two different questions: What will actually happen? What do 
current cohorts perceive will happen? What will actually happen is, of 
course, up to the U.S. Congress and can only be a matter of  political 
speculation.  What is more interesting is the nature of  the constraints 
within  which  Congress will  have  to operate. Clearly  the net wealth 
increment for future cohorts must be smaller than it has been for those 
considered in this paper, as a result of the maturation of  a pay-as-you-go 
system. But unless productivity growth and labor-force growth are ex- 
tremely low over the next 30-40 years, a positive net wealth increment 
will be possible on average. However, since the lump in the age distribu- 
tion will pass through the high-earnings range in the next decade or two, 
maintaining a more-or-less constant net wealth increment will require 
building up a transitional trust fund for the financing of later benefits. To 
have a pay-as-you-go system on average, the surplus and deficit years 
must cancel out in the long run only. 
Regarding how current cohorts perceive their future wealth, and there- 
fore how their current behavior is affected, the calculations here raise the 
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trends rather than to the future possibilities  just mentioned. If individuals 
only examine past historical trends, the results presented here should 
generate the expectation of  a much more generous system in the future 
than now, for the absolute value of  the net wealth increment has risen 
continuously for all cohorts retired to date. Although the growth rate of 
that increment has  fallen, it  is  still positive and  large.  Any  type  of 
adaptive expectations model would presumably generate this kind of 
result. Yet the more unfavorable possibilities for the future appear to 
have gained widespread recognition. Consequently, where the average 
citizen's opinion of  the future lies-between  the extremes of  a more 
generous system and a possibly bankrupt one-is  a question I leave to 
more intrepid analysts. 
9.3  Summary 
Net Social Security wealth, equal to the present value of benefits minus 
taxes, has risen in absolute value for all cohorts having reached retire- 
ment age since the inception of the Social Security system. However, the 
absolute change in wealth and its rate of growth have fallen. The growth 
of  wealth thus far has been predominantly a result of  benefit growth; 
taxes have affected net wealth very little, though this will change for 
future cohorts. Beyond this, the exact determinants of  the growth in 
wealth have fluctuated a great deal over time, being a result at differing 
times of  changes in recipiency rates, benefit-replacement rates, growth 
rates of  benefits over the retirement period, and life probabilities. The 
one unexpected finding was that net Social Security wealth grew faster 
than earnings all the way into the 1970s, implying that cohorts retiring 
later have been  made better-off  in proportionate terms than cohorts 
retiring earlier. 
Appendix A  Wealth Algorithms and  Data Sources 
The value of net Social Security wealth, S, is calculated for each cohort as 
the difference between the present value of benefits, SB, and the present 
value of  taxes. ST. The formula for SB is: 
75+  P,"  G:  H: 
SB = FE Yg  RRA7 BRA7  3, 
a=62 (1 + r)a-17 
75+  P;G:H~  + Ff7 Y&  RRg7  C 
a=65 (1 + r)a-17 
4  75 +  P; G:  H:  + Ff,Yg  C  RRt7BRt7  C 
k=3  a=65  (1 + r)'-17  ' 348  Robert Moffitt 
where 
Fi7 = Ni7/N17  (see text), sex i; 
Y& = annual earnings of  workers of age 60-64, sex i ; 
RR$,7 = recipiency  rate  of  benefit  type  k, equaling 
R65-69/N&9,  where i = m for k  = 1, and i =  f 
fork = 2, 3, 4; 
BRt7 = Bt5-69/Y&,  where i = rn  for k = 1; and  i =  f for 
k  = 2; and i = m fork = 3, 4; 
k 
Pj = NiINi,, sex i; 
G,k = B,k/B&  ; 
H,k = RR,k/RRt7. 
Here k = 1  if a male retired worker; k = 2 if  a female retired worker; k 
= 3 if  a wife; and k  = 4 if  a widow. This formula was used in the 
decomposition reported in table 9.6, with BR representing the replace- 
ment rate; G representing the growth rate of benefits during retirement; 
Y&  representing  earnings in that table; RRg7 representing  the basic 
recipiency rate; and H representing the growth rate of recipiency during 
retirement. 
The formula for ST is: 
1  75 i- 
ST=FZ C  PT  E,"W,"T," 
a= 17  (I + r)a-17 
1  75 +  + Ff7  C  PLEL WL TL 
a=17  (1 +  r)a-l7 ' 
where 
= employment of sex i at age a, divided by N;; 
= number of  covered workers of  sex  i at age a, 
Ti = estimated tax payments of covered workers of 
divided by E:, ; 
sex i at age a 
=pa(2  -  s,)  [u: YB:  + (1 - u:)  YM,] ; 
pa  = payroll tax rate at age a; 
s,! = non-Social-Security tax rate at age a ; 
u: = fraction of workers of  sex i at age a below the 
YBi = mean earnings of sex i at age a if  below YM,; 
YM, = taxable maximum earnings level at age a. 
taxable maximum ; 
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distributed  exponentially, as appears to be the case  (see the Annual 
Statistical Supplement of  the Social Security Bulletin, 1977-1979,  p. 93). 
Under the exponential assumption it can be shown that 
u6 = 1 -  exp[  -YM,/(1.44  YL)], 
where the factor of 1.44 is introduced to convert median earnings to mean 
earnings. The formula for the truncated mean of an exponential distribu- 
tion can also be used to generate a value for earnings below the max- 
imum: 
YBL = 1.44 Yi  U; -  YM,  (1 -  US). 
The above formulation of  ST was used in the decomposition reported 
in table 9.6, with taxes per covered worker represented by Ti,  coverage 
represented by W6, and employment by E6. 
The data sources are as follows: 
(1)  Population by age and sex, post-1937: Leimer and Lesnoy 1980 
(LL), appendix G; pre-1937: interpolated from decennial census figures 
from 1900-1940  Censuses. 
(2)  Number of  recipients of each benefit type by age: LL, appendix G. 
(3)  Number of  covered workers by sex and age: LL, appendix G. 
(4)  Payroll tax rate from 1937:  Annual Statistical Supplement (ASS)  of 
(5) Taxable maximum earnings levels: 1977-1979  ASS. 
(6)  Median earnings by age and sex since 1937: 1977-1979ASS7 p. 90; 
1972 ASS, p. 63; and 1968 ASS,  p. 55. 
(7)  Non-Social-Security tax  rate by  year:  ratio of  tax payments  to 
personal income from National Income and Product Accounts. 
(8)  Employment by sex and age: 1980 Handbook of  Labor Statistics, 
table 18, for post-1947; interpolated from employment and age-specific, 
labor-force data for 1937-1946  reported in  Historical  statistics  of  the 
United States, U.S. Bureau of  the Census. 
(9)  Benefits by type by age: annual ASS and Social Security Yearbooks 
from 1940 to date. 
(10)  Current Price Index used to deflate all nominal values: Historical 
Statistics, p. 210. 
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Appendix B  Estimation of  After-Tax 
Earned  Wealth 
The formula for V,  the after-tax value of cohort earnings discounted to 
age 17, is: 
(Y? + TEr)(  1 -  s,)  75  + 
V=F$  2  P,"EF 
a=17  (1 +  y7 
f + TE;)(I  -  s,) 
(1 +  4-17 
i-  F17 7y  P; 
a=17 
where TEb is the employer portion  of  the payroll tax, and all other 
variables are as defined in appendix A. Note that the employer portion of 
the tax is added to observed earnings to be consistent with the shifting 
Table 9.A.1  Post-1937 Earnings Regressions" 
















-  .20* 
-  .11* 
-  .02 
-  .03 
.  DOd 
-  .02 
.  OOd 
-  .03 
-  .17* 
.08* 
-  .01 
1.28* 
.33* 
-  .33* 
-  .02 
.06 
-  .02 
.OOd 
-  .04 
.oo 
-  .06* 
-  .09* 
-  .06* 
.02 
2.10* 
Max (log W -  4.5, 0)  -  .93*  -  .43* 
World War I1 dummy: 
= 1 if  year is 1942, 
1943, 1944, or 1945  .06  -  .19* 
Constant  -6.29*  -  10.00* 
RZ  .94  .93 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
"Dependent variable: logarithm of  E;(Y: + TE;). 
bOf the form: Max (A -  A;,  O),  where A;  is the denoted age. 
cW  = real  average weekly  earnings  of  production  workers  in  manufacturing  by  year 
(source: Historical Statistics, p. 169, and 1980 Handbook of  Labor Statistics, p. 188). 
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“Earnings data not available. 
assumption employed in the calculation of ST. Note too that Y represents 
conditional earnings (i.e., of  workers only); it must be deflated by the 
employment rate to obtain per person earnings in the entire cohort. 
The terms in Vinvolving ages after 1937 can be obtained from the data 
reported in appendix A,  but portions of each cohort’s profile prior to 1937 
cannot. Nor are employment data by sex and age available prior to 1937. 
Instead, all the cohort age data post-1937 were pooled  into a single 
regression and the earnings equations shown in table 9.A.1 were esti- 
mated. The results were used to impute a value for expected earnings 
pre-1937 (or, more precisely, a value for the employment rate times the 
sum of  full earnings-see  the footnotes to the table).  Implicitly it is 
assumed that the shape of  the age profile remained unchanged prior to 
1937; only the intercept, changing as a result of the average manufactur- 
ing wage, was altered. Because this imputation is obviously subject to 
some error, ratios of  V to available post-1937 annual male earnings were 
also calculated. The results  are shown in table 9.A.2. As  the table 
indicates, the trends are the same as those in S/V reported in the text. 
Notes 
1. There is also the question of the extent to which the net transfer eventually received 
by any cohort was actually perceived at  younger ages, and there is the need for determining 
how cohorts not yet  retired  perceive their  Social Security wealth.  Still, it would  seem 
preferable to assume that wealth perceptions are based on the actual experience of existing 
retirees rather than on the latest projections of the Social Security Administration. For one 
attempt to model perceptions in this fashion, see Moffitt (1981). 
2.  Another major difference between the wealth value calculated here and that calcu- 
lated in the FMLL algorithm is that the latter assumes that all individuals at each point in 
time have the same income, regardless of  age. This undoubtedly distorts the shape of  true 
cohort earnings profiles and hence the calculation of tax payments. 
3.  However, a few projections are made in the calculations below, although only for the 
remainder of  the lifetimes of  those who have already retired by 1977. 352  Robert Moffitt 
4.  The sex ratio is not shown in table 9.6 because it has stayed virtually constant over the 
5. Assume no inheritance or other forms of  non-life-cycle unearned income. 
6. In any case, it would be difficult to do in the context of this paper. Although the 
benefits of  those retiring at age 65 in each year can be obtained separately in the data, the 
benefit streams of this subset of individuals as they age and their particular lifetime earnings 
streams cannot be broken out from aggregate data. 
period and hence accounts for none of  the change in S. 
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Comment  Joseph F. Quinn 
The paper by  Robert Moffitt has two goals, to provide  a systematic 
examination of the trends in Social Security wealth since the beginning of 
the system in 1937 and to analyze the causes of these trends. The paper 
begins with a discussion of  the conventional wisdom on Social Security 
wealth; that 
(1) the cohorts that have retired up to now have received far more than 
an actuarial return on their contributions; 
(2)  the size of  the bonus (the intergenerational transfer) has fallen 
over time; and 
(3) this pattern is exactly what you would expect in a pay-as-you-go 
system. 
Early generations had little time to contribute, and they were able to 
profit from the growth in productivity and population over the subse- 
quent decades-the  chain-letter effect. This paper basically confirms the 
conventional wisdom, with an exception noted below. 
The paper begins with a short description of  OASI-the  retirement 
and survivors’ components of Social Security. It emphasizes the impor- 
tant point that the relationship between contributions and benefits is very 
loose.  This is certainly true for individuals. Some die early or work 
forever and therefore never receive benefits; others retire early and live 
and collect for decades. There are individual winners and losers. But this 
is also true for cohorts, in which these individual differences wash out. 
The  analogies  between  Social  Security  and  welfare  programs  are 
stronger, I believe, than those between Social Security and pension or 
insurance plans. This is important because it is the main reason for a study 
such as this-cohorts as a whole can gain or lose. 
The paper follows the actual flows of  Social Security contributions 
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(from employees and employers) and benefits for eight cohorts of Amer- 
icans, and asks whether each cohort gained or lost, how much, and why. 
The cohorts are defined by five-year intervals-the  first includes those 
aged 65-69 in 1942, and the last those aged 65-69  in 1977. No calculations 
are done on those who have not reached the traditional retirement age of 
65, since the books are not yet closed on them. Actually, the books are 
not  yet closed on anyone still alive. Despite the emphasis on actual 
benefits paid, therefore, some future projections have to be made for the 
last two cohorts. Moffitt assumes that benefits will grow in the future at 
the same rate that they did for the previous cohort during the same age 
intervals (70-74  and 75 +  ). This probably exaggerates the growth, since it 
projects the dramatic increases of the early 1970s into the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. But this is unlikely to alter the basic flavor of the results. All 
the data, by the way, are aggregate. 
Table 9.1 and figure 9.1 show that real benefits have been rising over 
time, but by no means smoothly. In fact, there were several periods of 
real decline, and two periods of  dramatic increase-the  early 1950s and 
the early 1970s. (This was back in the days when Congress would bring 
home the bacon periodically [after each 6-8  points of accumulated infla- 
tion, it appears] with well-publicized and universally applauded benefit 
increases. Unfortunately for current representatives, one Congress de- 
cided to capture the present discounted value of all future applause and 
indexed the benefits once and [perhaps] for all.) Since earnings were 
rising over time along with benefits, the replacement rates in table 9.1 
have risen less dramatically than benefit levels alone. 
Table 9.2 and figure 9.2 document the dramatic increase in recipiency 
rates-from  under 10 percent of  the total cohort aged 65-69 in 1942 to 
near 90 percent by 1977. Part of this is explained by individuals reaching 
eligibility by obtaining the necessary quarters of  coverage, but most is 
from the extensions of  coverage to new categories of individuals over the 
years. 
Moffitt then turns to the debit side of  the ledger-taxes.  This side is 
more difficult, since the aggregate tax data are not available by age and 
sex. The contributions are therefore estimated on the basis of  earnings 
data (which are available by age and sex) and tax rates. Since only median 
earnings are available, Moffitt has to assume a functional form for the 
earnings distribution to determine how many people are over the max- 
imum taxable amount. It is interesting to note how low the maximum 
contributions were until the 1960s. The youngest group in this sample 
(those 65-69  in 1977) was already 50 when Social Security taxes really 
began to rise. This is why they all made out so well, and why we will not. 
The heart of  this paper brings the two sides together and calculates 
Social Security wealth for each cohort-defined  as the difference between 
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name, given how wealth is usually defined in the literature. Moffitt is 
calculating net or windfall wealth, the increment in wealth which the 
system has provided or the excess over what the cohort “deserved.” If the 
cohorts’ taxes equaled their benefits, Moffitt’s calculated wealth would 
be 0. 
The basic results are given in table 9.4 and are described in somewhat 
unusual terms. Both the benefit and tax streams are discounted down, 
with a 3 percent interest rate, to the year in which the cohort was aged 17. 
The difference (the cohort windfall) is then divided by the entire popula- 
tion of the cohort at age 17. This makes for small numbers. For example, 
the oldest cohort, aged 15-19  in 1909, received an average increment of 
$24 each, in 1967 dollars. This is not the annual flow. This is the per capita 
stock equivalent of  all the windfall ahead. Admittedly, $24 long enough 
ago can be a lot of money. I’ve read that the $24 the Indians received for 
the Island of  Manhattan, if  wisely invested, would be worth more than 
the entire island is worth today. Oh, for an IRA in 1626. 
The age to which one discounts obviously makes no difference to 
relative magnitudes, which is the central focus of the paper. But dividing 
by the population rather than by the number of people in the system or 
the number of  eventual recipients does. In the early years, Moffitt is 
averaging together a much larger average subsidy to those people in the 
system with the zeros of those who were not. Whether this is appropriate 
depends on what the purpose of  these numbers is-a  topic to which I’ll 
return. 
With this definition, Moffitt finds that the net Social Security transfer to 
each succeeding cohort has grown over time, to nearly $600 per person 
(at age 17 in 1967 dollars) for the last group. This is nearly a tenfold 
increase in the thirty years since 1947. The increase would be less drama- 
tic if  restricted to those in the Social Security system. The rate of growth 
of  the wealth increment has fallen steadily, down to about 2 percent per 
year by 1977. 
Moffitt then decomposes these basic trends in a number of  ways. He 
shows that the increase in the wealth bonus has been dominated by the 
benefit side-huge  benefit increases partially offset by much more mod- 
est tax increases. In table 9.6 both the benefit and tax components are 
further decomposed into such elements as the coverage of  the system, 
benefit and tax rates per person covered, and life expectancy. It is difficult 
to know what to carry away from this table. Some of  the components 
change so drastically from period to period that generalization seems 
impossible.  For  example, the initial replacement  rate component  of 
benefits per recipient in table 9.6 changes from -  63% to +  155% to 
-62%  over the last three cohorts, while benefit growth changes from 
+  72% to -  120% to +  35%. What do we learn from such erratic move- 
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Table 9.8 includes some miscellaneous wealth indicators. It shows that 
the patterns of  wealth  bonuses  over time  are similar under  various 
discount rates (2, 3, and 4 percent). The main point  of  the paper is 
restated in terms of  internal rates of  return. They are always positive, 
obviously, and far in excess of any realistic real rate of return. They have 
dropped, however, from nearly 20 percent (in real terms) for the first 
three cohorts to just under 10 percent for the last two. The chain letter, it 
appears, is coming to a halt. 
In a final interesting set of  calculations, Moffitt estimates the propor- 
tion of total lifetime earnings that the Social Security  bonus represents. In 
an actuarially fair system, it would be 0. He finds, surprisingly, that the 
ratio actually rose through 1972 (when it reached 8.3 percent), and has 
only fallen since then. Although this wealth bonus has been growing at 
slower and slower rates, it has nonetheless, until just recently, been 
growing faster than earnings. 
This paper describes and discusses a new series on Social Security 
wealth. It is basically an accounting paper-appropriate  for this confer- 
ence-and  an interesting one. It does not focus on either explaining or 
predicting behavior. My comments have less to do with what is in the 
paper than with what is not. I would like to suggest how this work might 
be incorporated into a larger piece which I think would be a very signifi- 
cant contribution to this growing literature. 
A lot of  concepts of  Social Security wealth are in circulation. At the 
aggregate macro level, there are series by  Feldstein  (1974), Munnell 
(1974), Barro  (1978), Leimer  and Lesnoy  (1980), and  others.  With 
individual microdata, wealth definitions have been developed by Blinder, 
Gordon and Wise (1983), David and Menchik (1981), Hurd and Shoven 
(1981), and Burkhauser and myself (1983). They are proliferating, and it 
is beginning to become confusing. 
Is one of these definitions of Social Security wealth right and the others 
misguided? No.  It is not  an issue of  right and wrong,  but  rather of 
appropriate and inappropriate-to  a specific policy question. As I see it, 
there are two main reasons for a series on Social Security wealth. The first 
concerns income and wealth distributions. The Social Security system is 
picking and filling a great number of pockets, and the sums involved are 
large. One is tempted to ask how it all comes out. How do the rich fare? 
The poor? Men and women? Single and married persons? Early and later 
generations? These are interesting  questions which  require  a certain 
definition of  Social Security wealth. 
The second major focus is the explanation and prediction of behavior. 
The Social Security Administration transfers huge sums of  money, and it 
is inconceivable that this transfer does not have behavioral impacts. The 
major areas studied thus far have been savings behavior, labor supply and 
retirement decisions and, more recently, bequests. These research prob- 
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What is conspicuously absent from the literature is an exposition of how 
these various  concepts  of  Social Security wealth  differ and which is 
appropriate for which policy issue. 
In the estimation of any of these series, a number of decisions have to 
be made. These decisions affect the final numbers. Let me mention three. 
How should benefits be measured, by what was actually dispersed or by 
what was expected at some previous time? As an example, there were 
huge real increases in benefits in the early 1970s, as Moffitt documents. 
These were huge windfall gains to recipients which, I suspect, were not 
anticipated. How should they be treated? It depends, obviously, on the 
question being asked. If  the distributional impact of  Social Security is 
being studied, the windfalls should be included in the calculation, as 
Moffitt does. On the other hand, if  one is analyzing the actual retirement 
decisions of  individuals in  1969, these  unanticipated  real  gains  are 
irrelevant. It would be better to base wealth calculations on expected 
future benefits, regardless of whether these expectations proved accurate 
or not. 
Should benefits  be  measured  as  actual  or potential?  By  working 
beyond 65, an individual reduces his Social Security wealth below what it 
would have been if  he had chosen earlier retirement.  Social Security 
wealth is endogenous because it depends on labor supply decisions. The 
distributional impact depends on the Social Security benefits actually 
claimed by an individual or a cohort. Yet it would be a grave error to use 
this  concept in  a  behavioral  study, where  an  exogenous  concept  is 
needed. To use the actual amount would be to reverse causation. Those 
who continue to work, even if  totally unaffected by  their retirement 
income options, will obviously end up with lower Social Security wealth 
than those who do not. But to deduce that the low wealth (thus misde- 
fined) forced or induced the additional work would be wrong. 
A final issue is the treatment of past taxes. Most Social Security wealth 
series ignore  them  completely and define current  wealth as the dis- 
counted stream,of future benefits minus any future taxes to be paid. 
Moffitt’s series is different, because all taxes and benefits are counted. 
Which approach is correct? As always with economic questions, it de- 
pends. 
It is not clear from this paper what the purpose of these calculations is. 
Moffitt mentions two motivations: First, this series had never been calcu- 
lated. Second, the author has an interest in the impact of Social Security 
on aggregate savings and capital stock. Yet most of the paper seems to 
deal with intergenerational income redistribution  rather than savings 
behavior. 
I will summarize this point, specifically and in general. This paper is 
weak on why this particular series is of  interest. How and why does it 
differ from other series? What policy question is it designed to answer? In 
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freeze movement to counter this proliferation, a paper elucidating the 
differences between and uses of these series would be a welcome addi- 
tion. 
My  last suggestion for additional research is much easier said than 
done. This is one prerogative of being a discussant-to  suggest to others 
what you know you would not do yourself. The once nearly unanimous 
support for Social Security is  eroding.  Much of  the current political 
upheaval on this topic stems from precisely the issue that Moffitt has 
addressed here. Due to long-run changes in demographic structure and 
productivity growth, the chain letter is coming to a halt. Many members 
of  the current generation of  contributors feel that Social Security will 
leave them net losers. Do we learn anything from this analysis about 
whether this conventional wisdom is true or when it will become true? 
This would obviously require projections of  future benefits-an  under- 
taking that Moffitt has wisely avoided. But it might well explain, in very 
simple terms, an extremely important current additudinal shift. 
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